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There is one final point that we would like to mention. It is quite possible that when hackers launch DoS attacks against Web servers, mail servers or other machines located behind a firewall, that the firewall will fall victim to the DoS rather than the intended target.
Often system administrators consider this just as deadly a consequence and overlook the difference. While it certainly is bad for your firewall (or other border device) to go down due to a DoS or any other reason, it is better the perimeter defense machine go down than the hosts it is protecting. In such a scenario, the internal hosts and their data and resources have been taken off-line rather than compromised.
This is not a desirable situation, but can be remedied by rebooting the firewall (or switching to a back-up firewall). When systems are compromised, backup recovery methods must be taken, which are often more complex and time consuming. And they do not address the potential for loss to the organization if sensitive information has been released to the public.
Additionally, having the DoS land on your firewall, DMZ or honey pot allows the system administrator (if they are monitoring the network) time to respond before the hacker reaches their ultimate target, the truly valuable corporate data and internal hosts. The firewall can be rebooted, the servers can be taken off-line, and countermeasures can be enacted. We do not want our defenses to go down, but rather they than the assets they protect.
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